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The Admissibility of Eyewitness-Identification Expert
Testimony in Oklahoma
I. Introduction
“There is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who
takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”1
This proclamation by Justice Brennan drives home the significance of
eyewitness testimony at trial; it is perhaps the most compelling of all
testimony.2  On the other hand, it may also be the most fallible type of
testimony.  The United States Supreme Court long ago recognized the
potential unreliability of eyewitness identification by declaring that the
“vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”3  Furthermore, the
Court acknowledged that eyewitness misidentification “probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.”4  According to The
Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, eyewitness
misidentification was critical to convictions in over seventy-five percent of
cases in which the defendant was later exonerated by DNA evidence, making
it the number one cause of wrongful conviction in the United States.5
It is true that mistaken identifications and wrongful convictions abound in
the American criminal justice system, but, for many people, these tales only
exist in the abstract.  Arvin McGee of Tulsa, Oklahoma, knows the reality of
witness misidentification all too well.  In 1987, a man entered a laundromat
and attacked the twenty-year-old woman working there.6  The victim was
bound and locked in the bathroom of the laundromat until her attacker returned
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18. Id.; Nicole Marshall, Man Who Avoided Rape Trial Charged in Burglary, TULSA
WORLD, June 13, 2007, at A9, A11, available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?
subjectid=14&articleid=070613_1_A9_SHALL04072&archive=yes.  The fourteen million
dollar award was later reduced to twelve-and-a-half million in a settlement.
19. Marshall, supra note 18.
20. Id.
and carried her over his shoulder and placed her in a car.7  The perpetrator then
drove to an isolated area and raped the victim.8  Two years and three trials
later, Arvin McGee was convicted for this offense and sentenced to 365 years
in prison.9
The principal evidence against McGee was the victim’s identification.10
During trial, multiple discrepancies in the victim’s description of her assailant
were revealed, but to no avail.11  Testing of a semen sample collected from the
victim did not exclude McGee as the potential perpetrator.12  McGee
adamantly denied his involvement in the crime, offering an injury as a
defense.13  McGee’s injury required surgery and would have made him
physically incapable of committing the crime.14  Nevertheless, McGee was
convicted of rape, kidnapping, forcible sodomy, and robbery after his third
trial.15
McGee spent over twelve years in prison before the Oklahoma Indigent
Defense System took his case and arranged for testing of the DNA evidence.16
The test excluded McGee as the contributor of the semen, and therefore, as the
perpetrator of the crime; a second test confirmed the results.17  McGee was
exonerated in February 2002, and a jury eventually awarded him fourteen
million dollars for wrongful incarceration.18  The jury award was the largest
ever in the United States for wrongful incarceration.19  The DNA results linked
another man, Edward Alberty, to the crime, and Alberty was subsequently
charged, but a 2002 law could not be applied retroactively to permit his
prosecution.20
Arvin McGee has resumed what most would consider a normal life.  Since
his release, he has married, become a father and stepfather, and resumed a
relationship with a son who was an infant at the time of his conviction in
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24. The Innocence Project has identified four other individuals who were wrongfully
convicted by Oklahoma courts due, at least partially, to eyewitness misidentification.  For
details of these cases, and many others, see http://www.innocenceproject.org (follow “Know
the Cases” hyperlink; then follow “Search Profiles” hyperlink; then search with “Eyewitness
Misidentification” as the Contributing Cause).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
28. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert
Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 46 A.L.R. 4TH 1047 (2009), for a selection
of cases from each state that has addressed the admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert
testimony.  States notably missing from the list include Hawaii, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Virginia. 
1989.21  He became involved in his church and enrolled in college classes, and
now enjoys caring for his children and exercising.22  McGee is not angry over
his wrongful imprisonment, though he has every reason to be.23 
Arvin McGee’s story sheds light on the rampant problem of
misidentification.  He was deprived of a substantial portion of his life but,
fortunately, was freed before it was too late.  Nevertheless, his is not the only
story of an innocent person fighting a wrongful conviction premised on
witness misidentification.24  It is not known how many innocent people are
spending their days in America’s, and Oklahoma’s, prisons due to mistaken
identification.  One potential solution to this crisis is the introduction of
eyewitness-identification expert testimony. 
Stripped down to its most basic function, eyewitness-identification expert
testimony focuses on the reliability of eyewitness identification.  The expert
is usually a trained psychologist who will discuss the psychological processes
of perception and memory and how they factor into witness identification.
The goal of the expert testimony is to expose the weaknesses of eyewitness
testimony, encouraging the jury to more carefully determine the reliability of
eyewitness testimony, and thereby prevent a wrongful conviction premised on
mistaken identification.  Currently, most state courts have adopted one of three
rules regarding the admissibility of such testimony.  Some jurisdictions
categorically exclude eyewitness-identification expert testimony,25 while
others leave the question of admissibility to the trial judge’s discretion.26  A
third view requires admissibility in limited circumstances.27  A few states,
including Oklahoma, have not explicitly addressed the admissibility of
eyewitness-identification expert testimony.28
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At present, Oklahoma relies on statutory and case law regarding expert
testimony in general, but these rules do not clarify whether Oklahoma courts
should admit eyewitness-identification expert testimony.29  The frequency of
misidentification and the severity of its consequences emphasize the
importance of this testimony at trial.
Eyewitness-identification expert testimony has been allowed in Oklahoma
courts, but on an inconsistent basis.30  Oklahoma courts must take a stronger
stance in their view toward the admissibility of such testimony.  The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should seize the first opportunity to fill
this jurisprudential void and thereby remove the uncertainty regarding the
admissibility of this type of testimony.  This comment examines the science
behind eyewitness identification and analyzes the case law regarding the
admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert testimony, with the purpose
of providing Oklahoma courts with some assistance in developing a better-
defined standard.  A clear standard will be beneficial to both courts and
practitioners, as it will promote efficiency, consistency, and justice. 
Part II of this comment explains the science of perception, memory, and
facial recognition and the expert’s role in informing the jury as to how these
psychological factors might affect eyewitness identification.  Part III discusses
the general admissibility of expert testimony, focusing on the relevant sections
of the Oklahoma Evidence Code and Taylor v. State31—Oklahoma’s leading
opinion on expert testimony—and its adoption of the United States Supreme
Court standard, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.32  Part III also
recounts the few Oklahoma cases specifically regarding eyewitness-
identification expert testimony.  Part IV examines the cross-jurisdictional
treatment of eyewitness-identification expert testimony, as well as the three
approaches to admissibility that have materialized from the case law.  Part V
analyzes the merits of each approach.  Part VI concludes that Oklahoma courts
would be best served by embracing the limited admissibility rule for cases
where eyewitness identification is uncorroborated and factors undermining its
reliability are present; while also establishing admissibility guidelines




33. LAWRENCE TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 7 (1982).
34. Volumes have been written on the psychological processes affecting eyewitness
identification.  It is nearly impossible to cover every issue inherent in witness identification in
complete detail without the science becoming the dominant focus.  For a thorough treatment of
the subject, see BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY: VOL. I: MEMORY FOR EVENTS (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2006); THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: VOL. II: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE (R.C.L. Lindsay et
al. eds., 2007); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,
(Matthew Bender & Co. 4th ed. 2007) (1987); TAYLOR, supra note 33. 
35. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 13.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 15.
II. Perception, Memory, Facial Recognition, and the Expert’s Role
There are four basic reasons for eyewitness misidentification: the witness
may be lying, the witness’s perception may be impaired, the witness’s memory
may have failed him, or the witness’s recollection may have been influenced
by subsequent suggestions.33  To determine the likelihood that a
misidentification has occurred, a thorough understanding of psychological
principles pertaining to perception, memory, and facial recognition is
necessary.34  This section presents the psychological factors affecting the
formation of memory in eyewitnesses identification to which experts have
most often testified.  It then focuses on specific factors affecting facial
recognition, and briefly explains the role of an eyewitness-identification expert
witness.
A. Eyewitness Memory Formation
A witness’s perception of an event and the creation of a corresponding
memory occur in three stages: acquisition, retention, and retrieval.35
1. Acquisition
The acquisition stage, also known as perception, is where the witness
actually experiences the given event.36  Psychologists recognize two types of
factors that affect an eyewitness’s perception—event factors and witness
factors.37
a) Event Factors
The first type of factor, known as an event factor, is a quality inherent in the
event itself.38  The lighting conditions at the time and location of the given
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
516 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:511
39. See id. at 16-19 (identifying how lighting conditions at the time of observation affect
perception and subsequent memories).
40. Id. at 16.
41. Id.
42. Kenneth R. Laughery et al., Recognition of Human Faces: Effects of Target Exposure
Time, Target Position, Pose Position, and Type of Photograph, 55 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 477,
483 (1971).
43. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 24-28 (explaining how observation of a violent
event may impair witness perception and memory).
44. Id. at 21 (citing Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons
Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 265
(2004)).
45. Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts about “Weapon Focus”, 11 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 55, 55-62 (1987).
46. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 21 (differentiating between varying degrees of
ease with which different types of facts are perceived and recalled).
47. Id. at 21.
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id. at 39. 
event can affect a witness’s perception.39  As common sense indicates, humans
have better vision in good lighting than in poor lighting.40  Good lighting
allows a person to store more information about an event in his memory;
consequently, he will have to remember more upon later recall.41  The duration
of an event also plays a role in perception, as the longer one observes an event,
the more precise his memory of that event will be.42  Another event factor that
may be of substantial importance is violence.43  When a person witnesses a
violent act, his ability to recall details of the crime is reduced, but the effect on
his ability to identify the perpetrator is uncertain.44  A phenomenon known as
“weapon focus” also shows that the presence of a weapon inhibits an
individual’s ability to remember other details of a crime, as well as the
perpetrator.45  An overarching concern is that some event factors are simply
harder to remember than others.46  For instance, important facts, such as
physical characteristics of a defendant or colors of clothing, are recalled with
varying degrees of ease and accuracy.47
b) Witness Factors
Witness factors, which are characteristics inherent in the witness, are the
second type of factor that has the potential to affect perception.48  There is a
range of individual factors that may play a role in a witness’s perception.  Age
of the witness has been shown to affect one’s perception.  Generally, children
give less detailed accounts than adults, but their narratives are not necessarily
less accurate.49  Experimental data reveals that twelve-to-fourteen-year-olds
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/3
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50. TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 15.
51. Id.
52. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 39.
53. TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 14.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. at 26-28.
57. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 44.
58. Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 16 (2006). 
59. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 44.
60. Fradella, supra note 58, at 16.
61. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 46.
62. Id. at 45.
are more accurate in identifying faces than six-to-nine-year-olds.50  Not only
does recognition improve with age in children, but memory does as well.51
Conversely, elderly witnesses are less accurate than younger adults.52  It has
been shown that eyewitness competence increases until the late teenage years
and gradually falls off after the age of sixty.53  This may be due to
physiological factors that are unavoidable with time, such as decrease or loss
of hearing and vision.54  A witness’s vision is critical to accurate eyewitness
identification; a jury cannot expect a nearsighted witness to provide accurate
testimony concerning an event observed at a considerable distance.55  It may
also be helpful for the jury to know whether the witness wears glasses (and
whether he was wearing them at the time of the event), is colorblind, or suffers
from any other visual defect.56
There is no clear-cut answer as to which gender provides more accurate
eyewitness testimony.  However, it does appear that males more accurately
remember culturally male-oriented items and females more accurately
remember culturally female-oriented items.57  An example of a male-oriented
item might be the make of a car, whereas a female-oriented item may be a
piece of clothing.58  This result may suggest that men and women pay different
amounts of attention to particular details.59  In spite of this difference, gender
does not usually affect the reliability of identification of persons.60  
Individuals with special training (i.e., law enforcement) may be able to
recognize and remember certain unique details better than untrained
individuals, but ordinary details are not usually better remembered.61  A good
example of a precise detail that may be noticed by a law enforcement officer,
but not necessarily a layperson, is an individual wearing a jacket on a warm
day, perhaps suggesting the concealment of a weapon.62  Drugs and alcohol
also have palpable effects on memory, but the extent depends on
circumstances in which the drug is used and the individual’s tolerance to the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
518 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:511
63. Id. at 46.
64. Id. at 36-37.
65. Id. at 13.
66. See id. at 53-57 (citing studies that demonstrate increasing forgetfulness over time).
67. Id. at 53-55.
68. Id. at 56.
69. Id. at 57 (citing Kenneth Deffenbacher, On the Memorability of the Human Face, in
ASPECTS OF FACE PROCESSING (H.D. Ellis et al. eds., 1985)).
70. Id. at 57.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 59.
74. Id. at 59, 62.
drug.63  Finally, if a person has certain expectations of an event, those
expectations may cause him to “see” or “hear” things that never really
happened.64
2. Retention
Retention is the second stage of memory formation, occurring during the
time that passes after acquisition and before retrieval.65  Unfortunately,
memories may fade during this time period.  As one would expect, retention
is often accompanied by forgetting; the length of retention interval may affect
forgetting.66  A late nineteenth century German study of memory centered on
the concept of “forgetting” and showed that a significant amount of new
information is forgotten soon after acquisition, and forgetting then becomes
steadier along the  “forgetting curve.”67  In contrast, more recent studies have
shown that memories do not fade as severely or as quickly.68  One study,
focused particularly on facial recognition, shows that after a brief encounter,
a face is forgotten in less than a year.69
There are two distinct causal categories of forgetting.  The first cause,
known as “interference,” occurs when certain events interfere with others,
creating a distorted memory or causing a person to completely forget.70  Most
people engage in numerous activities in their lives, thereby making it difficult
to keep the memory of each experience in order.71  The second cause is called
“deliberate” or “motivated” forgetting, where a person forgets simply because
they want to do so.72  
Information obtained through certain activities occurring after a person
witnesses an event, often referred to as after-acquired information, has the
potential to distort the memory of that event.73  For example, information
gathered by talking to authorities or other witnesses, questions from
authorities, or viewing media accounts of the event may enhance a memory or
completely alter it.74  Furthermore, a person’s own internal wishes, thoughts,
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75. Id. at 66.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id. at 70.
78. See id. at 70-72 (addressing how the questioning method, particularly wording, dictates
what type of answer is received).
79. Id. at 70.
80. Id. at 71.
81. TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 17.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 39.
85. Id. at 103-108.
and desires may alter his recollection post-event.75  These factors may affect
how well a witness retains the memory of the event he perceived.
3. Retrieval
The retrieval stage occurs when the witness tries to recall stored
information.76  The manner in which a memory is retrieved affects how the
witness recounts what he saw.77  For instance, the particular method of
questioning used when interrogating a witness may inhibit his recollection of
the specific details of the event.78  A witness who is allowed to give his own
narration of the event, rather than only give responses to leading questions, is
more likely to provide an accurate, although less complete, story than one who
is asked specific questions.79  Leading questions are permissible to ask of
certain witnesses at trial, particularly hostile ones, but such questions may
elicit a different type of response (and perhaps a different account) than a more
general question would.80
The significance of this difference is most obvious when one considers child
witnesses.  Courts often allow counsel to ask leading questions of children,
even though children are extremely vulnerable to suggestive questioning.81  By
leading a child to an answer through phrasing a question in a certain way,
counsel is essentially putting words in the child’s mouth.82  This technique
effectively alters the child’s retrieval process and thereby may produce an
inaccurate memory due to a child witness’s willingness to comply.83  While
children are not necessarily more impressionable witnesses than their more
mature counterparts, they may be in certain situations, such as on direct or
cross-examination.84
B. Facial Recognition
There are many variables that affect facial recognition; however, there are
two that are especially important to eyewitness identification—cross-racial
identification and unconscious transference.85  That an individual can better
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86. See Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race,
13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 330, 330-34 (1969) (finding that white students
recognized faces of their own race more precisely than faces of black students).
87. See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 103-06 (citing multiple studies that demonstrate
such a result).
88. Id. at 106.
89. TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 39.
90. Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 180 (2006).
91. Hon. Robert P. Murrian, The Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony Under the
Federal Rules, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 379, 380 (1998-1999).
92. Id.
93. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 34, at 57.
recognize faces of his own race compared to those of a different race is well
established.86  Studies in this area have led to the conclusion that an eyewitness
is more likely to misidentify a member of another race than a member of his
own race.87
Unconscious transference occurs when a person seen in one instance is
confused with a person seen in a second instance.88  The witness’s brain
unconsciously superimposes memories on top of each other, usually at the
expense of memorial accuracy.89  Even when a witness is confident in his
identification, this confusion of memories may cause him to misremember
exactly when and where he actually saw the identified person—whether at the
scene of the crime or only later in a lineup at the police station.
C. The Expert’s Role
One study has perfectly described the role of an eyewitness-identification
expert at trial: “[t]ypically, eyewitness-identification experts are prepared to
testify in court about the extent to which the research literature explains how
a particular factor, considered alone or in combination with others, likely
would affect the reliability of an identification.”90  Eyewitness-identification
expert testimony is general, rather than specific, in nature.  This means that an
expert may not give an opinion as to whether the specific identification in the
case is reliable.91  An eyewitness-identification expert (typically a
psychologist) may also testify to the psychological factors, such as those
mentioned above, that might have affected the identification at issue.92
By maintaining impartiality, a psychologist can objectively educate the jury
regarding factors of which the jurors have little or no knowledge and about
which they often possess biased (and often incorrect) beliefs.93  An eyewitness-
identification expert may begin with a general explanation of the basic
psychological factors relating to the eyewitness process; yet he must be careful
not to speak too generally, such that the only function of the testimony is to
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94. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 354.
95. Id. at 354-55.
96. See id. at 355 (identifying specific factors that frequently provide opportunities for the
introduction of eyewitness-identification expert testimony).
97. Id. at 353.
98. Id. at 356.
99. See id. (discussing the comparison jurors must make between lay witness testimony and
expert testimony).
100. The sections of the Oklahoma Evidence Code discussed in this comment are virtually
identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Compare 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2403 (Supp. 2003)
(adds “unfair and harmful surprise” and deletes “waste of time”), with FED. R. EVID. 403;
compare 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2702 (Supp. 2003) (deletes “thereto”), with FED. R. EVID. 702.
promote general awareness.94  To ensure that an expert witness can take the
stand, his testimony must relate to a material issue in the case.95  The factors
he explains must specifically relate to the facts of the case at hand, or the
information will be of no assistance to the jury.  This is not uncommon, as
many of the abovementioned factors are critical to cases that turn on
eyewitness identification.96  These issues form the basis of an expert’s
testimony, with the goal of challenging a jury’s natural predisposition of
confidence in the reliability of an eyewitness.97
An eyewitness-identification expert is, in a sense, competing with the
eyewitness at trial.98  The eyewitness is recounting what he actually saw (or
believes he saw), whereas the expert’s knowledge is based on research
gathered in a laboratory or university.99  Thus, an expert must be convincing
to the degree that jurors do not rely on their own preconceived (and often
misplaced) beliefs.  He also must be able to convey his message through the
use of ordinary language so the ordinary juror can process its complexities.
Once he has testified, the expert’s task is complete.  In making its final
credibility assessment, the jury is free to accept any, all, or even none, of the
expert’s testimony.
III. Eyewitness-Identification Expert Testimony Complies with the
Applicable Sections of the Oklahoma Evidence Code
Before any expert witness is allowed to testify, his testimony must comply
with the applicable evidentiary rules.  In Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Evidence
Code100 (Code) provides the proper standards to which the testimony must
conform.  These rules fall into two principal categories: relevancy and expert
testimony.
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101. This is apparent from a portion of the title of Section 2402 of the Code declaring
“Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.”  12 OKLA. STAT. § 2402 (Supp. 2003).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 2401.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 2403.
106. Leo H. Whinery, Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion
or Cumulative Nature of Evidence, in 1 OKLAHOMA PRACTICE, COURTROOM GUIDE TO THE
OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE CODE § 2403, at 286 (2009).
107. Roberts v. State, 1994 OK CR 1, ¶ 32, 868 P.2d 712, 722. 
108. See Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 1994 OK 146, ¶ 31, 890 P.2d 881, 889 (holding that an
A. Relevancy
Relevancy is a hurdle that must be cleared before any piece of evidence,
including expert testimony, is admitted at trial.101  Sections 2401, 2402, and
2403 of the Code primarily govern relevancy.  Section 2402 provides that “all
relevant evidence is admissible,” and “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.”102  For purposes of the Code, evidence is logically relevant if it
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable.”103
An eyewitness identification of a defendant will nearly always be a fact of
consequence in a criminal case.  Yet to be logically relevant, eyewitness-
identification expert testimony must also make the accuracy of the
identification more probable or less probable.104  An eyewitness-identification
expert will likely testify to the psychological factors apparent from the
particular facts of the case in which he is testifying.  By testifying to these
influences, the expert aids the jury in determining whether an accurate witness
identification is more probable or less probable.  Thus, eyewitness-
identification expert testimony satisfies the threshold relevancy requirements
of the Code and is therefore admissible.
Nevertheless, Section 2403 provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful
surprise.”105  The preferred view of this test is that in balancing relevancy
against a potential danger, the court should resolve any doubt in favor of
relevancy, and therefore, in favor of admissibility.106  The literal language of
the statute further supports this view, specifically through inclusion of the
word “substantially.”107  On the other hand, the inclusion of the word “may”
implies that this determination rests entirely within the trial judge’s discretion
and will only be disturbed upon a finding of an unambiguous abuse of
discretion.108  A Section 2403 inquiry depends on the precise facts of each
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/3
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appellate court will not overturn a lower court’s section 2403 finding unless it is a clear abuse
of discretion).
109. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2403 (Supp. 2003).
110. See Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, ¶ 14, 889 P.2d 319, 326 (opining that admission
of expert testimony is subject to Section 2702 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code).
111. For the remaining sections of the Oklahoma Evidence Code governing expert
testimony, see 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2703-2705 (Supp. 2003). 
112. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
113. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  The Frye test requires that expert testimony must be
based on a scientific technique that has gained “general acceptance” in its field.  Id. at 1014. 
114. 1995 OK CR 10, 889 P.2d 319.
115. Id. ¶ 16, 889 P.2d 319, 329.
116. Id.
117. Id. ¶¶ 17-21, 889 P.2d at 329-30.
case, such that a sweeping general conclusion as to whether eyewitness-
identification expert testimony is always admissible cannot be reached.
Relevant expert testimony may only be deemed admissible upon a finding that
none of the listed dangers substantially outweigh the testimony’s probative
value.109  Even if the eyewitness-identification expert testimony overcomes the
low hurdle of admissibility for relevance, it must also satisfy the Oklahoma
Evidence Code’s provisions pertaining to expert testimony generally.110
B. Expert Testimony: The Daubert Standard
Oklahoma case law offers no real guidance on the admissibility of
eyewitness-identification expert testimony.  Consequently, Oklahoma courts
principally rely on the Code’s rules governing expert testimony in general to
determine the reliability and, thus, admissibility of the testimony.  The most
significant of these rules is Section 2702 of the Code.111  Section 2702—like
its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 702—embraces the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.112  Daubert embodies an ideological shift away from the prior expert
testimony standard established in Frye v. United States.113  Oklahoma adopted
the Daubert holding in Taylor v. State,114 a 1995 Court of Criminal Appeals
case.  In Taylor, the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the amorphous
boundaries of Oklahoma law concerning expert testimony; the
contemporaneous adoption of Daubert provided direction where the courts had
once wandered somewhat aimlessly.115  Observance of the Daubert standard
also guaranteed that state courts could properly incorporate the Oklahoma
Evidence Code into their decision-making.116  Within the Taylor opinion, the
Court of Criminal Appeals thoroughly discussed the Daubert test and its
requirements.117
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At its core, Daubert recognizes the trial judge’s role as a gatekeeper who
must require both the reliability and relevancy of novel scientific evidence.118
These requirements are delineated in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.119  To be
found reliable, the expert’s testimony must be based on “scientific . . .
knowledge,” which, in turn, “must be derived by the scientific method.”120
“Scientific” means the testimony must be grounded in the practices of science,
whereas “knowledge” implies a higher standard than personal opinion or
uncorroborated conjecture.121
The Daubert opinion recognized several general factors that can assist the
trial judge in determining whether expert testimony is “scientific
knowledge.”122  These factors serve as a guide to a trial judge in fulfilling his
gatekeeping responsibility.  Initially, a judge may determine whether the
theory or technique underlying the testimony can be or has been tested. 123
Another consideration is whether the theory or technique has been published
and analyzed by peers.124  A third concern is the known or potential rate of
error of the proffered theory or technique.125  Finally, a judge may consider
whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted in the scientific
community.126  To be sure, these factors are not an exhaustive list the trial
judge must complete before making his determination; there is no set standard
to which the judge must adhere.127  Rather, the trial judge possesses some
discretion in resolving which factors to use and how to use them.  Additional
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Evidence Code.  See supra Part III.A, for an exposition of their requirements.
136. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
137. Id. at 591-92; Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, ¶ 20, 889 P.2d 319, 330. 
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139. According to Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a), as well as Oklahoma Evidence Code
Section 2704, expert testimony may address an ultimate issue in the case.  FED. R. EVID. 704(a);
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2704 (Supp. 2003). 
It appears that eyewitness-identification expert testimony is, in fact,
“scientific knowledge.”  The methodology of eyewitness reliability research
is well established in the scientific community.129  Data is gathered through
studies or experiments, then analyzed, and finally reviewed by peers before
publication.130  To become generally accepted in the scientific community, a
hypothesis must be tested several times and consistently confirmed.131  
Research into the reliability of eyewitness testimony is relatively
uncontroversial—the consistency of the research results has been described as
“impressive.”132  The “core findings” in the field are virtually undisputed, and
have been tested in more than 2,000 studies conducted over the past three
decades.133  In the end, the judge’s conclusion as to whether the testimony is
“scientific knowledge” will depend on the particular theory or theories to
which the expert purports to testify and whether they actually comply with
Daubert requirements.134
The relevancy requirement of Rule 702, which is adhered to in Daubert,
expands on Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403, as well as to the
equivalent rules in the Code.135  Rule 702 requires that the expert testimony
“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.”136  Courts, including the United States Supreme Court and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, often recognize this requirement as one
of “fit,” meaning that some connection must exist between the expert
testimony and the pertinent issue.137  The rule also requires that an expert be
qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”138
In cases in which an eyewitness-identification expert is called to testify, the
accuracy of a witness identification of the defendant is often a central issue.139
As discussed above, numerous factors may be at play with regard to the
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accuracy of the identification.140  The specific factors depend on the facts of
the case, but frequently these factors are beyond the common knowledge of the
laypersons serving as jurors.141  Jurors may possess a certain degree of
understanding of factors that may cause a mistaken identification, but they
often do not have an expert’s training in determining the extent to which those
factors may render an identification unreliable.142
An expert explanation of the specific factors arising from the facts of each
case serves to assist the jury in determining whether the identification is
accurate, and provides the requisite connection to the resolution of the issue.
Eyewitness-identification experts are usually psychologists who are well
informed of “the cognitive and social factors affecting eyewitness
testimony.”143  They are frequently employed by large universities, are well-
read in the literature on eyewitness identification, and are suitably trained in
scrutinizing identifications.144  Because they possess these characteristics,
eyewitness-identification experts should be easily qualified as experts within
the meaning of the Code.
C. Oklahoma’s Ambiguous Law Regarding Eyewitness-Identification
Expert Testimony
Eyewitness-identification expert testimony must satisfy evidentiary
standards, but also should be subjected to a more specific analysis.  However,
Oklahoma currently has no substantial case law to which its courts can look
for guidance in determining whether to admit eyewitness-identification expert
testimony.  The Court of Criminal Appeals has only addressed this issue on a
relatively small number of occasions and has not articulated a clear standard.145
Thus, Oklahoma does not fit neatly into any of the three categories described
in Part IV infra.  
In 1982, Oklahoma decided its first reported case involving eyewitness-
identification expert testimony.146  In King v. State, the Court of Criminal
Appeals upheld the admission of expert testimony concerning psychological
factors affecting eyewitness identification although the court’s reasoning was
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not revealed.147  Only a portion of the expert’s testimony, about a totally
nonrelated case, was excluded because it would not have been helpful to the
jury.148  The court referred to Sections 2701 through 2705 of the Oklahoma
Evidence Code as the foundation for the partial exclusion.149  Later that year,
the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion that offers the only real
guidance on the admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert testimony.
In Smith v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court’s
decision to exclude the testimony of an eyewitness-identification expert.150
The trial court found that the testimony would not aid the jury in its
determination, and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in so finding.151  The precedent for this holding was
Riggle v. State, a case which dealt with whether a doctor who had graduated
from medical school five days prior to the examination to which he testified
qualified as an expert, rather than whether his testimony would be helpful to
the jury.152
Eberhart v. State provides another example of the Court of Criminal
Appeals declining to overturn a trial court’s admission of expert testimony.153
In that particular case, the appellant actually contended that the trial court
erred in failing to give a proper jury instruction on the untrustworthiness of
eyewitness identification.154  The appellate court recognized the predicament
presented by the eyewitness testimony and the resultant need to warn the jury
of its potential unreliability.155  The jury heard expert testimony on the subject,
which the court acknowledged was certainly as helpful as, if not more helpful
than, a jury instruction.156  Again, the court allowed eyewitness-identification
expert testimony but did not provide its justification for doing so.
The same issue arose in Bristol v. State.157  An expert for the appellant
testified that eyewitness identification is questionable and inconsistent;
furthermore, the expert conveyed that eyewitness identification is reliable only
one-quarter of the time.158  Nevertheless, the appellant claimed that the trial
court erred by declining to give a jury instruction regarding the unreliability
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of eyewitness identification.159  The Court of Criminal Appeals did not find
reversible error because the jury had already been warned of the unreliability
by the expert’s testimony.160  Once again, the court acquiesced in the
admission of eyewitness-identification expert testimony, but neglected to
explicitly provide its logic. 
All of these cases were decided several years before the Court of Criminal
Appeals approved and adopted the Daubert holding.161  Additionally, these
cases do not provide any specific, comprehensible rules on eyewitness-
identification expert testimony.  This combination calls for a reevaluation of
the admissibility principles concerning this brand of testimony.  Most other
states and federal courts currently have more defined rules governing
admissibility;162 although adherence to these rules is not mandatory, they may
be persuasive for future Oklahoma cases.  The standards of other jurisdictions
are set forth in Part IV of this comment.
IV. An Overview of the Case Law on the Admissibility of Eyewitness-
Identification Expert Testimony
The Supreme Court of Florida, in McMullen v. State, succinctly grouped the
different approaches to the admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert
testimony into three categories.163  The first category of approach, known as
the “discretionary” view, is followed by a majority of jurisdictions and allows
for a trial judge to exercise his discretion when determining the admissibility
of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification.164  The second
approach is one of per se exclusion.165  In these jurisdictions, eyewitness-
identification expert testimony is categorically prohibited regardless of
circumstances.166  The third category is one of “limited admissibility,” where
it is an abuse of discretion to exclude eyewitness-identification expert
testimony in the absence of corroborating evidence.167  However, the Florida
Supreme Court neglected to address a fourth and final category of approach,
or lack thereof.  There is a small, but not insignificant, number of states that
have not explicitly voiced an opinion on the issue.  Oklahoma is one of these
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states and before determining which approach its state courts should follow,
it is helpful to examine each one in detail.
A. The Majority Rule: Pure Discretion
The “discretionary” rule provides that the decision to admit eyewitness-
identification expert testimony rests soundly within the trial judge’s discretion
and should only be disturbed if the court abuses its discretion.168  Although this
is the majority rule, its application is far from uniform.169  Because discretion
is so heavily dependent on facts and circumstances, there is no certainty in the
rule’s cross-jurisdictional treatment.  These jurisdictions have failed to
establish any universal rules concerning what facts might lead to an abuse of
discretion finding.  Consequently, different jurisdictions have reached wide-
ranging conclusions about the admissibility of such testimony.170 
1. Judicial Deference: A Majority within the Majority
Trial courts often exclude testimony on the reliability of eyewitness
identification, and appellate courts simply defer to the lower court’s
decision.171  Courts have consistently offered two broad justifications for
excluding expert testimony on the factors affecting eyewitness
identification—either it invades the province of the jury or is not “helpful” to
the jury.172  More narrow arguments may arise subject to the precise facts of
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each case, particularly under the “unhelpfulness” rationale.173  A survey of the
cases involving eyewitness-identification expert testimony indicates that
appellate courts will most often defer to a trial court’s exercise of discretion.
a) Expert Testimony Invades the Province of the Jury
At trial, the jury is the sole determinant of witness credibility.174
Consequently, any interference with this determination may usurp the jury’s
role.175  On the federal level, the Second Circuit has found that the exclusion
of eyewitness-identification expert testimony is not an abuse of discretion
when it would affect the jury’s assessment of the eyewitness’s credibility.176
In United States v. Lumpkin, the expert proposed to testify that witness
confidence does not necessarily correlate to an accurate identification.177  The
court ruled that a witness’s demeanor, confidence included, bears on his
credibility, and credibility assessments belong exclusively to the jury.178  The
court believed that, by testifying to the relationship, or lack thereof, between
confidence and accuracy, the expert basically would have offered his own
view of credibility.179  The Second Circuit held that the testimony invaded the
province of the jury, and consequently, the district court’s exclusion was not
erroneous.180
The Eighth Circuit similarly upheld the district court’s ruling in United
States v. Kime, reasoning that the expert’s testimony invaded the province of
the jury.181  The court held that by offering specific testimony, the eyewitness-
identification expert was impeding on the jury’s credibility assessment, which
is a realm exclusive to the trier of fact.182
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b) Expert Testimony is Not “Helpful” to the Jury
Courts often find that the exclusion of eyewitness-identification expert
testimony is not an abuse of discretion because such testimony may not assist
the jury in its determination for three possible reasons: sufficient corroborating
evidence exists,183 cross-examination and jury instructions adequately serve the
same function,184 or the subject of the testimony is within the common
experience of the jurors.185
(1) Sufficient Corroborating Evidence Exists
Eyewitness-identification expert testimony may be needless presentation of
cumulative evidence, particularly in the presence of corroborating evidence or
multiple eyewitnesses.  Manley v. State provides a good example of this
analysis.186  The Supreme Court of Georgia identified seven separate pieces of
evidence, other than the eyewitness identification, connecting the defendant
to the crime.187  The court held that because sufficient corroborating evidence
was offered, the trial court’s exclusion of expert witness testimony was not an
abuse of discretion.188  The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Buell, held that
the exclusion of eyewitness-identification expert testimony did not likely
affect the trial verdict when the identification was substantially corroborated.189
 The identification was accompanied by a substantial amount of physical
evidence implicating the defendant.190  The physical evidence was the principal
factor in reaching the verdict of guilt; therefore, the exclusion was innocuous
and not an abuse of discretion.191
In Cook v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s refusal
to admit testimony from an expert on witness identification.192  The
consistency of several witness accounts, without proof of witness
collaboration, and the absence of evidence demonstrating impaired witness
perception led the court to determine expert testimony would have been of no
assistance to the jury.193  The court provided some guidance in finding that
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
532 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:511
194. Id.
195. 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).
196. Id. at 1104.
197. Id. at 1104-05.
198. Id. at 1107.
199. Id. at 1107-08.
200. See, e.g., State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 1102-03 (R.I. 2004) (holding that it is not
an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony when eyewitnesses are cross-examined and
the jury is properly instructed).




eyewitness-identification expert testimony is typically admissible when there
is a single eyewitness and the identity of the perpetrator is the main issue at
trial.194
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Smith,195 has found
that the presence of strong corroborating evidence may render the exclusion
of eyewitness-identification expert testimony harmless.  The defendant, Smith,
was on trial for a bank robbery in Ohio.196  Three bank employees
independently identified Smith as one of the robbers, and Smith’s palm print
was found at the crime scene.197  The presence of the palm print was
particularly damning because it directly contradicted Smith’s alibi defense that
he had never once been inside the robbed bank.198  The Sixth Circuit held that
the specific facts of the case led to a finding that the exclusion of expert
testimony did not prejudice the defendant.199  This case also implicitly lends
support to the view that the decision to admit eyewitness-identification expert
testimony should be addressed on a case-by-case basis, where adequate
consideration can be given to the precise facts of the case.
(2) Cross-Examination and Jury Instructions Are Acceptable Substitutes
On occasion, courts have held that cross-examination can adequately expose
a possible misidentification, and jury instructions can sufficiently inform the
jury of the potential weaknesses of witness identification.200  The Minnesota
Supreme Court relied on long-standing precedent in finding that exclusion on
these grounds was not an abuse of discretion.201  The trial court instructed the
jurors on the factors to consider in determining whether the identification was
accurate.202  Additionally, each of the eyewitnesses was vigorously cross-
examined in order to unearth any potential unreliability.203  This combination
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In State v. Werner, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that a trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the testimony of an eyewitness-
identification expert because he gave a comprehensive jury instruction.205  The
cautionary instruction directed the jury to consider the stress under which the
witness observations occurred, post-event information, and that a witness’s
certainty is insufficient to determine the accuracy of identification.206
Furthermore, the defendant had the opportunity to address each of these issues
on cross-examination so expert testimony was unnecessary.207
The federal circuits have also upheld exclusion when jury instructions or
cross-examination were substituted for eyewitness-identification expert
testimony.  The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Curry, did not find an
abuse of discretion when the district court rebuffed a proffer of eyewitness-
identification expert testimony.208  The district court found that the factors that
may affect identification were brought to the jury’s attention through voir dire
and cross-examination.209  This finding was enough, in the Seventh Circuit’s
eyes, to allow for exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence.210  The First
Circuit has also observed that it is not an abuse of discretion to exclude
eyewitness-identification expert testimony when cross-examination can
adequately expose the possible effects to which the expert would testify.211
When cross-examination can be used effectively, eyewitness-identification
expert testimony is less helpful than in situations when the factors affecting
identification cannot be demonstrated through cross-examination.212 
In United States v. Rincon, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court’s comprehensive jury instruction was adequate to inform
the jury, thus obviating the need for eyewitness-identification expert
testimony.213  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit buttressed its conclusion to uphold
exclusion in United States v. Kime by acknowledging that a comprehensive
jury instruction was given to address the information about witness
identification that would have been provided by an expert.214
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(3) The Subject of Expert Testimony is Common Knowledge
Information conveyed by an eyewitness-identification expert through his
testimony is sometimes described as “common knowledge,”215 not “outside the
common experience of mankind,”216 or not “beyond the ken” of the jury.217
Whether the subject of the testimony is actually “common knowledge” is a
determination for the trial judge.218  If a judge determines it is, the testimony
is often excluded.219
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that a trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding eyewitness-identification expert testimony, because
the trial judge correctly characterized the testimonial subjects as being within
the common knowledge of the jury.220  The expert proposed to testify to the
relationship between confidence and accuracy, and the effects of lighting and
the duration of observation, among other things.221  The court believed that
jurors knew that a witness account could be erroneous or forgotten over
time.222  This knowledge, in the court’s judgment, was sufficient to allow the
jury to evaluate the reliability of the eyewitness’s testimony without the aid of
expert testimony.223
In Johnson v. State, the proposed eyewitness-identification expert testimony
would have covered the effects of lighting and weather conditions, stress,
weapon focus, cross-racial identification, and the confidence/accuracy
relationship.224  The trial court refused to admit the testimony and the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that the exclusion was not a “clear” abuse of
discretion.225  The court acknowledged that the testimony might have been
helpful, at least as it pertained to the factors “less likely to be fully understood
by jurors,” such as cross-racial identification and weapon focus.226  Although
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/3
2011] COMMENT 535
227. See discussion infra Part V.A.1.b.
228. E.g., State v. Whaley, 406 S.E.2d 369, 372 (S.C. 1991).
229. 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983).
230. Id. at 1224.
231. Id. at 1220.
232. Id. at 1220-1221.
233. Id. at 1222.
234. Id. at 1224.
235. Id. at 1222-24.
236. 406 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1991).
it is a foundation commonly rested upon to exclude eyewitness-identification
expert testimony, the “beyond the ken” rationale is not immune to criticism.227
2. “Narrow Circumstances”: When an Appellate Court Will Most Often
Find an Abuse of Discretion
Appellate courts so often defer to a trial court’s exercise of discretion that
the majority rule appears to be discretionary in name only.  In operation, it
more closely resembles a rule of per se exclusion.  Yet while the trend in many
states is to uphold exclusion of eyewitness-identification expert testimony,
some state courts have found exclusion to be an abuse of discretion under
specific factual circumstances.228
The Arizona Supreme Court was the first to thoroughly address the issue of
eyewitness-identification expert testimony and rule in favor of admissibility
under certain factual circumstances.  In State v. Chapple,229 the court held that
a trial court’s order to exclude an expert’s testimony was erroneous and, thus,
an abuse of discretion.230  The trial court believed that the information to be
presented was within the “common experience” of the jury,231 but the Arizona
Supreme Court ruled that the jury was not necessarily aware of the effects of
factors inherent to the situation, such as stress, post-event information,
unconscious transfer, and witness confidence.232  The court explicitly stated
that such knowledge could not be assumed, and the expert’s testimony would
have assisted the jury in resolving the factual issues before it.233  Although the
court ultimately ruled in favor of admissibility, it established a caveat to its
holding—the standard allowing for a trial court to exercise its discretion in
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony would remain in place.234  The
court’s reversal was dictated by the distinctive set of factual inconsistencies to
be resolved by the jury and the need for assistance to reach a proper verdict.235
State v. Whaley provides another model for the circumstances in which a
trial court abuses its discretion.236  The Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that eyewitness-identification expert testimony is admissible, subject to the
trial judge’s discretion, when the core issue is the offender’s identity, the only
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proof of identity is eyewitness identification, and there is no other evidence to
corroborate the identification and make it independently reliable.237  When
eyewitness-identification expert testimony is excluded under such conditions,
as it was by the trial court, it is likely an abuse of discretion.238  This holding
resembles the “limited admissibility” rule, discussed infra, but does not
unequivocally adopt such a view.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky followed a similar line of reasoning in
Commonwealth v. Christie.239  Under the facts of the case, eyewitness
identification was the key evidence against the defendant, other direct
evidence against the defendant was lacking, and the circumstantial evidence
against the defendant was anemic.240  The trial court’s exclusion of eyewitness-
identification expert testimony under such circumstances was an abuse of
discretion under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 403,241 the analog to
Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2403.  Moreover, the court also found the
trial court abused its discretion under KRE 702 because satisfactory “narrow
circumstances” existed to admit the testimony.242  “Narrow circumstances”
may include cross-racial identification, unconscious transference, significant
time between the event and identification, and observation under duress,
among other things.243
The Tennessee Supreme Court recently overruled its prior rule of per se
exclusion of eyewitness-identification expert testimony in State v. Copeland.244
 At trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death after
being denied the opportunity to introduce expert testimony on issues relating
to the reliability of eyewitness identification.245  On appeal, the court, citing the
findings of multiple studies, expressed its apprehension over jury insensitivity
to factors affecting eyewitness memory, the imprudent replacement of expert
testimony with cross-examination and jury instructions, and the increasing
number of wrongful convictions due to misidentification.246  Because the
expert’s proffered testimony “would have given the jury a valuable context
within which to assess the eyewitness identification,” the court held that the
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exclusion of the expert’s testimony was in error.247  Because the error was not
harmless, the court remanded the case for a new trial.248 
The New York Court of Appeals recently broke from its long-standing
tradition of consistently deferring to a trial court’s discretion in excluding
eyewitness-identification expert testimony.249  In People v. LeGrand, the court
conceded that the admission of expert identification testimony is within the
trial court’s discretion, but found that the New York County Supreme Court,
in excluding such testimony, abused its discretion under the circumstances of
the case.250  Because there was no corroborating evidence, resolution of the
case centered on the witness identifications and the expert’s testimony would
have helped the jury to assess whether the identifications were accurate.251
B. Per Se Exclusion
A few jurisdictions never allow experts to testify to the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications.252  The Kansas Supreme Court has consistently
adhered to a per se rule that eyewitness-identification expert testimony is
inadmissible because the problems inherent in eyewitness identification are
well known to the lay juror.253  At one point, Kansas left the admissibility of
expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification to the trial judge’s
discretion, but eventually moved to a rule of per se exclusion.254  In lieu of
expert testimony, judges may give a cautionary jury instruction on specific
identification factors.255  Such an instruction, when paired with cross-
examination, is sufficient, in the eyes of the Kansas Supreme Court, to “protect
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the rights of the defendant.”256  The Supreme Court of Nebraska has also ruled
against the admission of eyewitness-identification expert testimony on this
subject, describing it as “unnecessary.”257  The court has consistently held fast
to precedent that eyewitness identification is a matter of “common experience”
and testimony on the issue would invade the province of the jury.258
On the federal level, the Eleventh Circuit has held that eyewitness-
identification expert testimony is inadmissible per se.259  This principle is
based on the idea that allowing the testimony provides an opportunity for the
expert to remark on the credibility of his opponent’s witnesses.260
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that any potential identification
problems could be parsed out by cross-examination and the jurors’ common
sense.261  Although followed by a very small minority, the rule of per se
exclusion remains a solution to which some courts still resort.
C. Limited Admissibility
The “limited admissibility” rule essentially holds that it is an abuse of
discretion to prevent an eyewitness-identification expert from testifying when
there is no substantial corroborating evidence in the case.262  The Supreme
Court of California, in People v. McDonald, was the first to adopt this rule.263
The trial court excluded expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness
identification because it would not only fail to assist the jury, but would also
usurp the jury’s role.264  In an argument opposing the traditional rationales
relied upon by courts in discretionary jurisdictions, the appellate court held
that this was an abuse of discretion and provided an in-depth explanation of
exactly how such testimony can assist the trier of fact and why it does not
usurp the role of the jury.265  It was conceded that some factors affecting
identification, like lighting, distance, and duration, are within the general
knowledge of the jury.266  However, the defense expert’s proposed testimony
also would have addressed the effects on perception of “the observer’s state of
mind, his expectations, his focus of attention at the time, the suddenness of the
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age of the observer and the observed.”267  The court concluded that the vast
amount of information in these areas was outside the realm of common
experience, such that its introduction through expert testimony would in fact
aid the jury in its determination.268
The California Supreme Court also addressed the trial court’s concern over
eyewitness-identification expert testimony invading the province of the jury.269
 The court found that because the expert did not dispute the accuracy of an
identification made by a specific witness in the case, he did not attempt to
impose on the jury’s credibility judgment.270  Any information communicated
by the expert would have explained the effects of the particular facts as they
would pertain to the typical witness.271  The jury still held onto the ability to
assess the weight and credibility of the eyewitness testimony, thus the expert
did not invade the province of the jury.272  Furthermore, the jurors were not
bound by the expert testimony as they could freely reject any or all of his
testimony without restraint.273
The crux of the court’s holding, however, was its determination of the
particular circumstances under which exclusion is an abuse of discretion.  The
court unenthusiastically acknowledged the discretionary standard, while
advocating for a new and different view.274  This novel outlook holds exclusion
in error when eyewitness identification is substantially uncorroborated and the
expert testifies to psychological factors, apparent from the record, that are not
commonly known to jurors.275
Montana has also adopted the limited admissibility rule, declaring it “an
abuse of discretion for a district court to disallow expert testimony on
eyewitness testimony when no substantial corroborating evidence exists.”276
While these limited circumstances do not arise in every case involving
eyewitness identification, they are of substantial importance in providing
guidance as to when eyewitness-identification expert testimony should be
admitted without question.  The limited admissibility rule does not do away
with the discretionary rule, except under narrowly-defined circumstances.  It
may be best described as a subdivision of the discretionary rule.
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The Third Circuit has promulgated a limited admissibility rule and is the
only federal court to set such precedent.  In United States v. Downing, the
Third Circuit held that eyewitness-identification expert testimony must be
admitted in some circumstances.277  The court relied on the Chapple and
McDonald holdings, finding their “narrow circumstances” rationales
persuasive.278  The court ruled that the testimony at issue would have assisted
the jury in its determination and therefore complied with Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.279  It is worth noting that the Third Circuit and the Supreme
Court of California established this rule several years before the first DNA
exoneration in the United States in 1989.280  Since then, 249 individuals have
been exonerated based on DNA testing; in seventy-four percent of these cases,
eyewitness misidentification was a determinant factor in conviction of the
defendant.281  These numbers expose the frailty of eyewitness identification,
and the consequent significance of ensuring that every identification is
accurate.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has hinted at the
appropriateness of the limited admissibility rule.  In Commonwealth v.
Santioli, the trial court was faced with a proffer of eyewitness-identification
expert testimony in a case in which the eyewitness identifications were
corroborated by physical evidence.282  The judge excluded the expert’s
testimony, due to substantial corroboration, and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld the ruling.283  Even so, the court took care to refer to the
“narrow circumstances” rationale of Chapple, McDonald, and Whaley.284  The
court was implicitly guiding lower courts by supplying a detailed factual
scenario upon which a finding of abuse of discretion may be predicated.285
Furthermore, the court acknowledged the “disparate” results that may be
reached under the discretionary rule and the lack of direction in this area.286
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This holding is not an overt adoption of the limited admissibility rule, but may
be viewed as an approval of the rule.
This is merely a summary of the case law emerging from the three views
toward the admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert testimony.  As
explained above, Oklahoma does not currently follow any of these three
views.287  Each one has proven itself workable in its respective jurisdictions,
but further analysis is necessary to recommend the proper approach for
Oklahoma courts.
V. Analysis of the Three Approaches to Admissibility in Order to Make a
Suggestion for Oklahoma Courts
Due to the lack of case law specifically addressing eyewitness-identification
expert testimony, Oklahoma basically has a blank slate from which to work.
Accordingly, Oklahoma is in an ideal situation to clarify its position given the
opportunity.  Before determining how Oklahoma should handle the
admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert testimony, it may be helpful
to further scrutinize the three approaches identified by the McMullen court and
the relevant scientific research as it relates to each view.  Each approach must
be critically examined before deciding the one to which Oklahoma should look
for guidance.
A. Exploring the Discretionary Standard
The discretionary rule often leads to disparate outcomes which invite a
meticulous critique of the rationales underlying the application of this rule.
One element particularly lacking from the results reached under the
discretionary view is consistency.  Because courts have reached varying
conclusions under the rule, it is important to examine the reasoning of the
various holdings.
1. The Rationales for Exclusion are Often Unpersuasive
Judicial reasons for exclusion are often unpersuasive.  They do not
necessarily reflect the strength of the scientific research and are frequently
unsupported.  The following sub-parts examine these rationales and why they
are unconvincing.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
542 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:511
288. See, e.g., VERNON’S OKLA. FORMS 2D § 10-8 (2009) (charging the jury to “determine
the credibility of each witness and the weight to be given the testimony of each witness”).
289. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1a.
290. TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 93.
291. People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 722 (Cal. 1984).
292. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.b.iii.
293. HON. D. DUFF MCKEE, CHALLENGE TO EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION THROUGH EXPERT




297. See Schmechel et al., supra note 90, at 192 (demonstrating the sizeable disparity
between the scientific findings and judicial impressions).
298. Id. at 177.
a) Expert Testimony Does Not Invade the Province of the Jury
Each juror’s job is to determine the weight and credibility accorded to a
particular piece of evidence, including eyewitness testimony.288  Eyewitness-
identification expert testimony may interfere with this determination, thereby
invading the province of the jury.289
To avoid this problem, an expert only testifies to the general factors that
may affect any eyewitness identification, rather than the specific identification
in the case.290  Any concern that an expert is substituting his view for that of
the jury is further obviated by the jury’s freedom to reject any or all of the
expert’s testimony, just as it may reject the eyewitness’s testimony.291  Such
freedom allows the jury to make its own credibility assessment, regardless of
expert opinion.
b) Experts Often Testify to Matters That Are Not Commonly Known
In excluding eyewitness-identification expert testimony, some courts
proceed on the notion that the subject of the testimony is within the common
understanding or everyday experience of the lay juror.292  This view is partially
correct, as some factors that have an effect on eyewitness identification may
be intuitive to the layman.293  The effects of lighting, visual acuity, and
observation distance on eyewitness identification are factors of which the lay
juror is normally cognizant.294  These factors can be fully and capably
addressed on argument and cross-examination.295  Certain other factors,
however, are less conspicuous, more complicated, and run counterintuitive to
common belief.296  As to these factors, there is some dissonance between
judicial belief and science.297
One prominent study has appropriately described such factors as “beyond
the ken” of the ordinary juror.298  This study was undertaken by three attorneys
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and one psychologist and aimed to determine “whether jurors understand, as
a matter of common sense, what makes some eyewitness identifications more
or less reliable that others.”299  In the absence of expert opinion, jurors are
relegated to relying on their own intuitive beliefs to provide a measure for
determining the accuracy of a particular eyewitness identification.300  The
results of the study indicate that these intuitive beliefs are often mistaken, both
as to the general workings of memory and the specific factors affecting
reliability.301  The study also found that the common misperceptions often were
found in substantial numbers amongst jurors.302
In general, jurors do not adequately understand the “complexity, selectivity,
and malleability” of memory, and thus cannot practically assess the accuracy
of identification.303  Further inhibiting this assessment is their lack of basic
understanding of the specific factors affecting perception and memory.304  One
factor is“weapon focus,” where, in the presence of a weapon, a witness tends
to focus on the weapon rather than the defendant’s appearance.305  The
research indicates that identifications are more likely to be accurate when a
gun is hidden compared to when it is in plain sight.306  The Schmechel study
further revealed that 37% of survey participants believed that the presence of
a weapon increases reliability of eyewitness identification; 33% believed that
it would not affect reliability or were unsure of its effect; and 30% believed
that the presence of a weapon decreases reliability of perception and
memory.307  When two-thirds of potential jury members’ common
understanding does not comport with reality, the educational value of an
eyewitness-identification expert witness is obvious, and exclusion of his
testimony should be considered an abuse of discretion.
Another factor pertaining to reliability is whether an event was violent, and
the associated stress under which the identification was made.308  Studies have
indicated that a witness’s memory of an event is less likely to be accurate if the
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event is violent.309  Here, slightly less than 40% of survey respondents thought
that violence leads to a more reliable memory; 33% again believed that
violence has no effect on reliability or were unsure of the effect; and 30%
properly comprehended the effect of violence.310  Eyewitness-identification
expert testimony again seems necessary in these cases, and its exclusion
should be considered an abuse of discretion.
Witnesses often have trouble estimating the duration of an event during
which an identification is made.311  The suggestion that identification accuracy
increases as observation duration increases is certainly within the realm of
juror common knowledge.  What jurors might not understand, however, is that
time assessments themselves are often overestimated.312  The survey results
indicate that only 37% of participants believed this finding to be true and 25%
thought that witnesses actually underestimate the time of observation.313
It is commonly believed that there is a high correlation between witness
confidence and accurate identification.314  The research supporting this
proposition is thin, however.315  Accordingly, juries should not accord great
weight to a witness expressing tremendous confidence in his identification.
Confidence is affected not only by the conditions under which the observation
occurred, but by subsequent interaction with police and other witnesses.316
The Schmechel survey found that 40% of participants believed that confidence
is an “excellent indicator” of reliability, whereas only 17% knew that the
correlation between confidence and accuracy is weak.317
Cross-racial identification is another psychological factor to which experts
frequently testify.318  The basic theory, supported by research, is that witnesses
generally have more trouble in identifying individuals of other races as
opposed to individuals of their own race.319  Cross-racial identification is a
volatile topic in eyewitness identification, as it has been shown that at least
40% of the DNA exonerations based on eyewitness misidentification have
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involved a cross-racial identification.320  Thirty-six percent of survey-takers
believed that cross-racial identifications are less reliable, and almost half of
participants thought that cross-racial identifications are just as reliable as
same-race identifications.321  Judges often describe the above issues as matters
of common sense.322  The results of this survey demonstrate that they are not;
thus, a judicial reevaluation of these principles should be in order.
Survey results like these above provide excellent guidelines to a trial judge.
In exercising his discretion, a trial judge should go through a three-phase
process.  First, a judge should think about the traits of the individual witness,
such as age, gender, race, intelligence, and life experience.  At the same time,
he must consider the facts of the case and search for memory-disruptive event
factors, such as stress, “weapon focus,” duration of the event, or cross-racial
identification.  Second, he must carefully consider whether any of these factors
could have affected the identification in the case at hand.  Third, he must
examine the proffer of expert testimony to determine if it will be helpful in
explaining the potential effects of the relevant factors.  In order to be helpful,
expert testimony must be sufficiently narrowly tailored, such that the factors
to which the expert testifies are evident from the facts of the case.  For
example, expert testimony on cross-racial identification is only proper if the
witness and the accused are of different races.
If any of the “beyond the ken” factors are of significant magnitude in
determining reliability and the testimony is relevant, a judge should lean
toward admissibility under the discretionary standard.  Eyewitness-
identification expert testimony is not just helpful in these instances—it is
essential.
c) Jury Instructions and Cross-Examination are Inadequate
Replacements for Expert Testimony
Another common judicial belief is that jury instructions regarding the
frailties of eyewitness identification adequately fulfill the same purpose as
expert testimony.323  Although true in some instances, this belief is often
mistaken.324  This point is best illustrated by two examples from state court
jury instructions.
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The first example is the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction regarding
eyewitness identification.325  According to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, this instruction is to be given when eyewitness identification is a
central issue in the case and the reliability of the identification is seriously
challenged.326  The instruction’s foremost directive is that eyewitness
identifications should be “scrutinized with extreme care.”327  It also advises the
jury to consider “the possibility of human error or mistake and the probable
likeness or similarity of objects and persons.”328  Then, the instruction lists five
factors that may affect the jury’s credibility assessment of the eyewitness
account.329  These factors, general in nature, include: (1) whether the witness
had a clear opportunity to perceive the defendant, (2) the certainty of the
witness identification, (3) whether the witness failed to previously identify the
defendant, (4) the certainty of the witness identification after cross-
examination, and (5) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the
defendant.330  Finally, the instruction charges the jury to find the defendant not
guilty if any of these factors (or any other evidence) create a reasonable doubt
as to the defendant’s guilt.331
This instruction is too generic to be of any tangible benefit to the jury.  An
array of factors may affect any given identification, and the requisite jury
instruction does nothing to promote juror awareness of any of these concerns.
In fact, it twice emphasizes eyewitness certainty, which studies have shown
does not correlate with the accuracy of eyewitness identification.  On the other
hand, eyewitness-identification expert testimony could amply explain each
identification-related issue and its potential effect on witness identification.
A second, more comprehensive instruction relating to eyewitness testimony
comes from the state of California.332  In order to properly assess the witness’s
credibility, the instruction guides the jury to consider twelve factors, including
the stress under which the observation occurred, cross-racial identification, and
the time elapsed between the criminal act and the identification.333  Even if
more detailed than Oklahoma’s instruction, the California instruction still fails
to show the jury how to apply the factors to the case at hand.  The listing of
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each factor simply brings them to the jury’s attention, but without more, there
is no explanation of exactly what they mean and how they may affect
identification.
Furthermore, jury instructions are given at the end of a trial, when it is too
late to be of any assistance to the jury in appraising the reliability of an
identification.334  When used alone, jury instructions are of little help to a jury
in appreciating the hazards of eyewitness identification.335  Jury instructions
should not be given in place of expert testimony, because expert testimony can
explain the scientific findings on perception and memory much more
substantially than a simple jury instruction.336
Judges also frequently suggest that cross-examination is a passable
replacement for expert testimony.337  This rationale assumes that counsel can
bring the factors affecting eyewitness identification to the jury’s attention.
This approach is inadequate because it is premised on the belief that these
factors are commonly known to lay jurors.338  As discussed above,339 many of
these factors are not known or understood by the jury.  Because they are
beyond the layman’s understanding, these factors cannot be sufficiently
developed through argument and cross-examination.  Furthermore, it has been
noted that when a witness is confident in his identification, even if mistaken,
cross-examination cannot effectively expose faults in his testimony.340  Even
if cross-examination can reveal the factors at issue, it is not helpful in the
application of such factors to the facts of the case.  Cross-examination is more
apt to reveal consciously false eyewitness testimony than mistaken testimony
given in good faith.341  Thus, eyewitness-identification expert testimony is
necessary to inform the jury of their potential effects on witness
identification.342
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2. The “Narrow Circumstances” Exception
Under the discretionary rule, a few courts have allowed eyewitness-
identification expert testimony in the presence of “narrow circumstances.”343
What constitutes a narrow circumstance depends on the particular court.  For
example, the Arizona Supreme Court characterized the proper conditions as
certain psychological factors that are beyond the common experience of the
jury.344  The New York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina identified the appropriate circumstances as those involving
uncorroborated identification.345  Kentucky’s highest court defined narrow
circumstances as particular testimonial subjects, such as cross-racial
identification and unconscious transference.346  Allowing testimony under such
circumstances will likely be upheld, while exclusion will likely be reversed as
an abuse of discretion.347  Thus, this division of the discretionary rule is a rare
example of when the application of the discretionary rule is fairly predictable.
These cases, and others following similar rationales, are the most helpful
under the discretionary rule because they specify when expert testimony is
beneficial.  Accordingly, they provide clear direction under a rule that
otherwise generally lacks it.  Before deciding whether to admit or exclude
expert testimony, a trial court should carefully examine the facts of the case
and determine whether they are similarly situated to the “particular” or
“narrow” circumstances acknowledged by other courts.  If so, an inclination
toward admissibility may be proper.
B. Dismissing the Per Se Rule
Any thought given to adopting a per se rule of inadmissibility should be
summarily dismissed, as it would be much too harsh.  In the absence of
eyewitness-identification expert testimony, a defendant’s primary opportunity
to inform the jurors of the potential unreliability of eyewitness testimony
comes through a jury instruction or cross-examination.348  As explained
above,349 these methods are deficient proxies for expert testimony.
Eyewitness-identification expert testimony is intended to reduce the possibility
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350. See Kristy A. Martire & Richard I. Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence
and Judicial Instruction on Juror Ability to Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony, 33 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 225, 225 (2009) (identifying expert testimony as a potential “safeguard” against
erroneous conviction based on eyewitness misidentification).
351. See, e.g., People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984) (describing the
circumstances under which “it will ordinarily be error to exclude [eyewitness-identification
expert] testimony”).
352. See id. (reinforcing the notion that the admissibility of expert testimony is normally left
to the discretion of the trial judge).
353. See id. (using the word “ordinarily” in the court’s holding indicates some measure of
consistency).  
354. Id.
355. Cf. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming that
of false identification.350  As the number of misidentifications grows, the
significance of expert testimony on eyewitness reliability grows
proportionately.  If it is categorically excluded, jurors are on their own, and
often will not be able to properly apply the relevant theories to the facts of the
case.  Consequently, the probability of wrongful conviction will rise and, in
turn, kindle the flame expert testimony is designed to extinguish.
C. Embracing the Limited Admissibility Rule
The limited admissibility rule only applies in cases where the identification
is uncorroborated and the jury does not understand the subject of the expert
testimony.351  In all other cases, the trial judge retains discretion to admit or
exclude expert testimony.352  Even in these instances, eyewitness-identification
expert testimony is often critical to a just resolution of the case.  When
eyewitness identification is the only evidence against the defendant, the
identification must be accurate.  In order to determine accuracy, the jury must
be aware of the factors affecting the identification.  Eyewitness-identification
expert testimony is the primary tool to promote such awareness.
The limited admissibility rule only applies in the narrowest of
circumstances, such that relatively few cases meet its requirements.  Even so,
the rule is an improved version of the discretionary rule.  This rule guarantees
consistent rulings when the identification at issue is uncorroborated and the
subjects of the expert’s testimony are normally unknown to, or misunderstood
by, the jury.353  If a trial judge does not allow expert testimony under these
conditions, it should be overturned as an abuse of discretion.354  Accordingly,
the limited admissibility rule provides the uniformity so often missing from the
pure discretionary rule: an explicit statement of what constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
Due to its restricted application, many cases involving eyewitness
identification do not fall within the bounds of the rule.355  Nevertheless, the
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application of the limited admissibility is triggered only “under certain circumstances”).
356. Cf. State v. DuBray, 2003 MT 255, ¶ 43, 317 Mont. 377, 387-88, 77 P.3d 247, 255
(Mont. 2003) (declaring explicitly that it “shall be an abuse of discretion” to exclude expert
testimony when a witness identification is uncorroborated).
357. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 280 (showing that seventy-four percent of
249 exonerations were convictions premised on erroneous identification).
358. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2102 (Supp. 2003).
implications of the rule for the cases it does reach are significant.356  The rule’s
firmness serves as a base guideline for trial judges and eliminates the
uncertainty so deeply rooted in the discretionary rule.  
VI. Conclusion
It is indisputable that eyewitness misidentification occurs at an astonishing
frequency.  The exact number of misidentifications can never truly be known,
but the number of exonerations in cases in which eyewitness testimony is a
principal factor in conviction may serve as an indicator.  Since 1989,
approximately 185 people have been exonerated after being wrongfully
convicted due to misidentification.357  This number of wrongful convictions
does not represent the ascertainment of the truth or just determination of
proceedings, two stated goals of the Oklahoma Evidence Code.358  In order to
help prevent the occurrence of mistaken identification in Oklahoma trials and
promote the goals of the Code, courts should allow the use of eyewitness-
identification expert testimony.
Because Oklahoma does not have an established rule regarding the
admissibility of eyewitness-identification expert testimony, it is in a unique
position to determine exactly how this question should be answered.  The best
solution is an adoption of the limited admissibility rule for cases involving an
uncorroborated identification and factors that are beyond the knowledge of
jurors.  In these circumstances, both courts and practitioners can presuppose
that eyewitness-identification expert testimony is admissible.  This certainty
will allow for greater efficiency and practicality in the criminal justice system.
Admissibility will increase the likelihood that the jury is responsive to the
psychological factors that can render eyewitness identification unreliable.
In theory, the limited admissibility rule is a feasible solution to the question
of when eyewitness-identification expert testimony should be admitted.  Its
effect is limited, as the rule only applies to circumstances that arise
infrequently and is not broad enough to govern all cases in which eyewitness-
identification expert testimony is necessary.  Therefore, in all other cases
involving a proffer of eyewitness-identification expert testimony, the trial
judge should retain the discretion to admit or deny the testimony.  In
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exercising his discretion, a trial judge should be sensitive to several
accompanying determinants.  First, it is important to take note of the factors
to which the expert will testify.  If the accompanying research indicates that
the factors are not commonly understood by the layperson (or the judge for
that matter), such as unconscious transference or cross-racial identification,
then the judge’s inclination should be in favor of admissibility.  If it is a factor
that is commonly understood, such as the effect of lighting, then a judge need
not be inclined to admit the testimony, but still may do so at his discretion.
Furthermore, a judge must also consider whether the testimony “fits” the
facts of the case.  That is, the testimony must be in unity with the facts of the
case.  This is essentially a determination of relevancy.  Additionally, a judge
must consider whether a jury instruction or cross-examination can adequately
expose any weakness in the identification at issue.  The judge must be
conscious of the aptitude and experience of the jurors and be careful not to
project his own understanding onto the jury.  Upon considering these issues,
it may be determined that eyewitness-identification expert testimony is
unnecessary.  This determination should only be reached after a careful
weighing of the subject matter of the proffered testimony and the
circumstances of the case.  In no case should expert testimony be denied
without a thorough inquiry into its application to the case and identification at
hand.
These proposals are merely suggestions.  They will certainly not eliminate
the problem of misidentification, but hopefully will help to reduce its
frequency.  Oklahoma courts have a unique opportunity to stand on the front
lines of the fight against misidentification.  One can only hope they will take
advantage of it and give serious consideration to the admission of eyewitness-
identification expert testimony.
Sean S. Hunt
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